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MITei’s eight low-carbon
       energy  centers  (Image
       courtesy of MIT Energy
       Initiative)          buted resources and enable significant cost sa-  investments and novel operational expenditures (in-
                            vings.                                    cluding payments to distributed resources).
                            • Granularity matters. The value or cost of electricity   •  Outcome-based  performance  incentives  can  re-
                            services can vary significantly at different times and   ward utilities for improvements in quality of service,
                            at different locations in electricity networks. Progres-  such as enhanced resiliency, reduced distribution
                            sively improving the temporal and locational granula-  losses, and improved interconnection times.
                            rity of prices and charges for these services can deli-
                            ver increased social welfare. However, these benefits   • Incentives for longer-term innovation are needed to
                            must be balanced against the costs, complexity, and   accelerate investment in applied R&D and demon-
                            potential equity concerns of implementation.  stration projects and learning about the capabilities
                                                                      of novel technologies and practices that may have
                            • Care must be taken to minimize distortions from   higher risk or longer-term payback periods.
                            charges that are designed to collect taxes, recover
                            the costs of public policies (such as efficiency pro-
                            grams, heating assistance, subsidies for renewable   The structure of the electricity industry should be ca-
                            energy, cross-subsidies between different categori-  refully reevaluated to minimize potential conflicts of
                            es of customers etc.), and recover residual network   interest.
                            costs (i.e., those network costs that are not recove-
                            red via cost-reflective charges).         • Network providers, system operators, and market
                                                                      platforms constitute the critical functions that sit at
                            • Policy makers and regulators must be wary of the   the center of all transactions in electricity markets.
                            possibility of societally inefficient “grid defection” if   Properly assigning responsibilities for these core fun-
                            residual network costs and policy charges become   ctions is thus critical to an efficient, well-functioning
                            too high. This may suggest an upper limit on the por-  electricity sector. It is also critical to establish a level
                            tion of these costs that can be collected in electrici-  playing field for the competitive provision of electrici-
                            ty tariffs rather than through broader taxes or other   ty services by traditional generators, network provi-
                            means.                                    ders, and distributed energy resources.

                                                                      •  As  experience  with  restructuring  in  the  bulk  po-
                            The regulation of distribution utilities must be impro-  wer system has demonstrated, structural reform
                            ved to enable the development of more efficient di-  that establishes financial independence between di-
                            stribution utility business models.       stribution system operation and planning functions
                                                                      and competitive market activities would be prefera-
                            •  Forward-looking,  multi-year  revenue  trajectories   ble from the perspective of economic efficiency and
                            with profit-sharing mechanisms can reward distribu-  would facilitate more light-handed regulation.
                            tion utilities for cost-saving investments and opera-
                            tions, aligning utilities’ business incentives with the   • If financial independence is not established, seve-
                            continual pursuit of novel solutions.     ral additional measures are critical to prevent con-
                                                                      flicts of interest and abuses of market power. These
                            •  Several  “state  of  the  art”  regulatory  tools,  inclu-  include: stricter regulatory oversight of distribution
                            ding an incentive-compatible menu of contracts, an   network planning and operation; legal unbundling
                            engineering-based reference network model, and   and functional restrictions on information exchange
                            automatic adjustment factors to account for forecast   and coordination between distribution system ope-
                            errors, can better equip regulators for an evolving   rators and competitive subsidiaries; and transparent
                            and uncertain electricity landscape.      mechanisms for the provision of distribution system
                                                                      services (such as public tenders or auctions).
                            •  Equalizing  financial  incentives  related  to  capital
                            and  operational  expenditures  can  free  utilities  to   •  Maintaining  a  data  hub  or  data  exchange  may
                            pursue cost-effective combinations of conventional   constitute a fourth critical function. Such a hub or



       46  Impiantistica Italiana - Gennaio- Febbraio 2018
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