Page 18 - Impiantistica industriale

OUTLOOK

haviour towards lower energy use, there is scope For example, for 2024, the electricity price is 12%
for a concerted policy push for energy efficiency, higher than a model run with no change in Russian
a postponement of nuclear retirements, and an energy import. Globally, the war leads to 3% lower
extensive renewable energy buildout. energy demand within two years, compared with
There is certainly opportunity for acceleration on our pre-war model run, mainly because of lower
these fronts: Belgian nuclear, French heat pumps, GDP.
German solar and pan-European wind will all con-
tribute to a lower dependence on imported Rus-
sian energy. Some of these options can make a Alternatives to gas
difference this year; others will need multiple years Ease and means of gas replacement depend on
to take meaningful effect. which sector it is used. Growth and greening of
While non-fossil supply and energy efficiency can electricity, and hence the decarbonization of end
and will be accelerated, there are counterforces at uses in the transport, building and manufacturing
work with respect to the energy transition. These sectors, is the most important means to decarbon-
include burning more coal to replace natural gas ize European energy use. Renewables and nuclear
and increasing costs of EV batteries and PV pa- have low operating costs and are at the top of a
nels. To this extent, the push for energy security cost merit order in our analysis, producing what-
works against the transition. ever quantities available. These quantities are not
Other effects of the war that are not linked to ener- sufficient in the short term to cope with the entire
gy security like reduced global trade and coopera- shortfall in gas – that is when gas needs to be re-
tion, such as the realignment of global logistics to placed by coal, which also has higher costs as a
address a mounting food crisis, and a shortfall of result of the war. The switch to coal is temporary.
critical minerals, could also slow down the energy Being the fuel of the last resort, we find that, by
transition. 2024 only 6% of the reduction in natural gas use
will be taken up by coal.
Other effects of the war that are not linked to ener- The postponement of nuclear retirements and
gy security like reduced global trade and coopera- higher utilization of existing nuclear assets together
tion, such as the realignment of global logistics to produce an important short-term effect and these
address a mounting food crisis, and a shortfall of developments are likely to happen in several coun-
critical minerals, could also slow down the energy tries, but notably not Germany. Nuclear production
transition. makes up for one-third of the shortfall in Russian
gas in 2023.
Modelling The Transition Unlike most other energy sources, bioenergy costs
have not grown due to the war, and it is possible to
The next edition of our annual Energy Transition grow bioenergy – mainly from sewage and waste-
Outlook is due in October, but we have run the fills – slightly over the coming few years. We find
model now to assess how the changes we have bioenergy makes up for 20 % of the shortfall in
seen since 24th February this year are likely to in- Russian gas in 2024.
fluence the energy transition in Europe.
The largest uncertainties have to do with the war
itself – its duration and possible escalation, and Nothing has lower costs and
whether strengthened countermeasures bring the footprint than the energy not
export of Russian oil and gas to Europe to com-
plete stop. While it is likely that Europe’s commit- “used, and Europe is putting
ment to its Fit for 55 climate plan will endure, public more effort into energy efficiency
reaction to energy affordability may challenge its to ensure energy independence
momentum in the short term. There are many other
imponderables, like whether the war will give rise to
a new cold war, or end in a calmer détente.
With all these uncertainties in mind, we have cho- By contrast, the main energy independence meas-
sen to model a scenario where the European ener- ure advanced by European politicians – a bigger
gy system discontinues the importation of Russian and faster renewable energy buildout – has a much
gas, with zero Russian gas imported from 2025 slower initial effect. It will take two years, for ex-
onwards. ample, for this faster buildout to make up 10% of
the shortfall resulting from an absence of Russian
Higher energy prices gas. However, while there may be a small impact
in 2023, it becomes more meaningful with each
Russia produces about 17% of global natural gas passing year. Over a five-year period, we see the
and import from Russia met 33% of Europe’s over- renewable buildout matching the 20% increase the
all natural gas consumption in 2020. When we let EU aims for, and by 2030, solar PV and wind will
our model choke Russian gas supply to Europe by make up for more than half of the shortfall in natural
80% in 2023 and 100% in 2025, and factor in the gas supply.
higher gas prices that result, we see a spillover to Higher commodity prices will inflate battery costs.
other areas, like electricity prices. EV uptake will suffer, such that the timing of the

16 16 Impiantistica Italiana - Maggio-Giugno 2022