Page 19 - Impiantistica industriale

milestone where 50% of new car sales in Europe
occurs is delayed by almost one year – 2028 rather
than 2027. This has further implications for long-
term decarbonization and delays the decline in oil
somewhat. Countries with ambitious 2030 decar-
bonization targets will need to review and possibly
strengthen incentives for EV uptake.
If we look at percentage changes, overall gas use
is down 1700 PJ or 9% in 2024 compared with
our pre-war model run. The biggest percentage in-
crease is in solar, which is up 9%. The overall effect
on the energy mix is limited, bearing in mind Eu-
rope’s overall primary energy demand is 70 EJ or
70,000 PJ. As a result of the decline in gas, the de-
carbonization of the energy mix increases to 34%
non-fossil energy sources in 2024, 2% higher than
our pre-war model run. This small acceleration en-
dures, such that by 2030, the overall change in the
share of non-fossil energy sources in the energy
mix continues to be 2% higher than the pre-war Gas demand shifts
prediction. Russia will be looking to the East to replace its en-
Nothing has lower costs and footprint than the en- ergy export revenue, but export capacity to China
ergy not used, and Europe is putting more effort and neighbours is currently limited and new trans-
into energy effi ciency to ensure energy independ- mission pipelines and LNG export terminals take a
ence. The standout action here is support for heat long time to build. Hence, we fi nd that gas produc-
pumps, and, as a result, we expect the overall en- tion in North East Eurasia, which includes Russia,
ergy demand in the building sector to improve a Ukraine and other former Soviet Union countries,
further 4% towards 2030, with effi cient electricity will decline by 24% in 2024, as there is not suffi -
use for heat pumps replacing some of the gas. cient infrastructure to export the gas.
In contrast, we estimate that Europe itself will
(Green) hydrogen push produce 12% more gas between now and 2030,
refl ecting the industry’s reaction to higher oil and
Hydrogen is an(other) important pillar in securing gas prices in the short term and responses to the
both Europe’s energy independence and the sus- pledge from EU to deliver more gas. High oil and
tainability of its energy mix. But its main challenge gas prices will stimulate new developments global-
is affordability. ly, but in the wake of this initial rush to new produc-
There are signals from Germany that the energy tion, over the next decade global demand will likely
crisis is reducing the opposition towards blue hy- reduce rather than increase, as GDP growth and
drogen (Recharge, 2022). However, when Europe globalization reduce, and both oil and gas produc-
is in dire need of gas to replace the phase-out of tion and transport hence inch a little lower.
Russian gas, it is unlikely that signifi cant amounts Thus, we anticipate that over-investments will re-
of surplus natural gas will be available for producing sult in lower oil and gas prices in the second half of
blue hydrogen. Furthermore, gas prices are high, this decade and our model suggests that this will
and that makes blue hydrogen, with its addition- lead to a small increase in global oil use later in the
al carbon sequestration and storage costs, less 2030s relative to our pre-war forecast.
competitive. Even if blue hydrogen remains cheap-
er than green hydrogen (produced from renewa-
bles by electrolysis) for the next few years, we fi nd A small acceleration of
blue hydrogen uptake low in Europe towards 2030 decarbonization and emission
and decreasing rather than increasing as a conse-
quence of the war. reduction
Europe has limited capacity for producing suffi cient The ultimate metric for decarbonization is reduc-
renewable electricity to simultaneously phase out tion in GHG emissions, and the net effect of the
fossil fuels from the power mix and produce mean- invasion in Ukraine will be a small acceleration of
ingful amounts of green hydrogen. Nevertheless, decarbonization and emissions reduction towards
policymakers continue to prioritize both objec- 2030. The main reasons for the difference are post-
tives. Consequently, we anticipate higher support poned nuclear retirements in the short term and,
for green hydrogen as part of the new push for in the medium term, a faster renewables buildout,
renewables and have factored a 12% lower hy- and increased energy effi ciency and lower eco-
drogen price into our model, compared with our nomic growth.
base case for 2030. In spite of increased support, The overall effect is, however, limited, amounting to
green hydrogen use in Europe will remain modest a 580Mt or 2.3% reduction in emissions in Europe
by 2030, albeit 25% higher compared with our pre- in the period 2022-2030, compared with a case
war model output. without a Ukraine war. In Figure 2, we show that

Impiantistica Italiana - Maggio-Giugno 2022 17 17