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Monopoly / Oligopoly        Institute              Competition
                                                                Plurality of gas producers, each of them
             Monopolist or Dominant Players  Stakeholders
                                                                has low market share (power)
             Vertically integrated       Gas Value Chain        Unbundled
             Integrated into Government bodies  Regulatory Body  Independent & Autonomous
             Bilateral trading
                                                                Multilateral & Bilateral Trading
             Only physical gas supply                           Physical & virtual supply
                                         Trade Mechanisms
             Predominantly mid-term supply
             contract without Price-formula &                   Predominantly short-term contracts
             Take-or-Pay                                        Long Term-Contracts
                                         Pricing Mechanism      Variety of pricing mechanisms (Spot,
             Predominantly regulated prices
                                                                Futures, Indexation etc)
                                         Gas Transportation Tariffs
             Non-Transparent indexation                         Transparent & Cost Reflective
                                         Model
                                         Model of Access        Regulated (transparent
             Negotiated
                                                                non-discriminatory rules)
             Export monopoly for pipeline gas &   Regulation of gas export  Competition both for pipeline
             competition for LNG export                         gas & LNG

            Table 1. Key forks in the development of the Russian gas market
            Source: compiled by the authors

            a monopoly (Gazprom) / oligopoly (Gazprom-No-  Regardless of which scenario will be accepted as
            vatek-Rosneft), or the movement to a competitive   the base one, it will allow for the formation of re-
            market. We agree with Tarr and Tomson that the   gulatory mechanisms and institutional environment
            Russian  market  would  be better served  on  both   that motivate market participants to minimize pro-
            economic and environmental grounds if Russia   duction and transaction costs, improve the quality
            would introduce competition in production of na-  of corporate governance and, thereby, increase the
            tural gas along with nondiscriminatory access to   efficiency of the gas industry and the competitive-
            pipelines for new gas suppliers.         ness of Russian gas.
                                                     In addition, it will create conditions when strategic
                The dilemma that the                 decisions on the feasibility, timing and scale of large
                Government of Russia faces           investments in new gas field development will be
                                                     made only in case of confirmed demand for gas
           “is whether to maintain                   and strong guarantees of its monetization.
                a monopoly/oligopoly,                It is worth noting that as a result of the decline in
                                                     gas demand in Europe in 2020, caused by decar-
                or stimulate competition             bonization policies and the coronavirus pandemic,
                                                     export prices for Russian gas in EU (minus the
            The dilemma that the Government of Russia faces   customs duty) were actually equal to the Russian
            is whether to maintain a monopoly / oligopoly, or   domestic gas prices. If
            stimulate competition. The key parameters and   this situation persists   We may be witnessing tougher
            content of the two scenarios are shown in Table 1.  for a relatively long pe-  competition among key Russian
                                                     riod, the right to export
            Each of these options has its advantages and di-  gas  may  not  be  as  at-“gas suppliers for domestic
            sadvantages, reacts differently to the challenges   tractive to independent   consumers. Structural reforms of
            and threats that the Russian gas industry and the   producers as it has   the Russian domestic gas market
            country’s economy are facing as a whole. However,   always been before.
            any of them is more preferable than maintaining the   We may be witnessing   will accelerate, and the course
            current status quo. Both of these scenarios provide   tougher  competition  towards developing competition
            for the strengthening of state regulation measures,   among key Russian gas
            but in the first case we are talking about direct re-  suppliers for domestic   will become more obvious
            gulation measures, and in the second - indirect,   consumers. Structural
            and in the future - antitrust.           reforms of the Rus-
                                                     sian domestic gas market will accelerate, and the
                                                     course towards developing competition will beco-
            Conclusion                               me more obvious.
                                                     The  ongoing  transformation  of  the  Russian  gas
            Our scenario approach lays the foundation for pur-  market and the adaptation of the Russian gas ex-
            poseful “designing” of a long-term and sustaina-  port policy to the new realities of the European gas
            ble gas market model in the Russian Federation.   markets are rather slow but seem consistent and



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